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The World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system is facing unprecedented 
challenges, following the United States (US) decision to block the appointment of Appellate 
Body members. The US has justified its blocking tactic, already implemented since 2017 by 
raising several procedural and substantive concerns with the Appellate Body’s failure to follow 
WTO rules. On 10 December 2019, the Appellate Body was however, forced to suspend its 
activities after the second terms of two of the remaining three members expired. While the 
WTO dispute settlement system continues to function at the panel stage, the Appellate Body is 
currently unable to review appeals because it lacks the minimum number of three members 
required to establish a division. In addition, any party to a dispute can block the adoption of a 
panel report by filing a notice to appeal which is likely to remain in limbo for an indefinite 
period. Numerous studies have discussed the Appellate Body crisis and its implications for the 
WTO dispute settlement system. Few, however, have critically analysed the validity of the 
concerns that the US has raised about the Appellate Body’s work over the past few years. 
Therefore, the purpose of this research is to discuss and critically analyse these concerns to 
determine whether the Appellate Body had indeed strayed from its limited mandate. In 
addition, the research will provide recommendations on how to save the appellate stage and 
ensure that appeals are resolved while WTO members attempt to find permanent solutions to 
this unprecedented crisis.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1. Background 
Until recently, the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system was referred 
to as the ‘jewel in the crown’ of the organization.1 Tirkey argues that unlike its predecessor the 
General Tariff on Trade Agreement of 1947 (GATT), the WTO dispute settlement system had 
been a great success during the first two decades of its existence.2 In addition, it has been 
regarded as being one of the most widely used state-to-state dispute resolution mechanisms in 
the world.3 For example, since 1 January1995, a total of 596 disputes have been brought to the 
WTO and over 350 rulings have been issued.4 This total number far exceeds that of other 
international tribunals such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) which were founded in 2002 and 1945 respectively.5 Most importantly, 
Ambassador Xavier Carim also stated that the WTO dispute settlement system has enjoyed 
wide support among the member states who value it as an efficient and fair mechanism to 
resolve their trade disputes.6 
 
Typically, a trade dispute arises when a member state has reasons to believe that the actions of 
another member state are contravening any of the covered agreements or their WTO 
obligations.7 The dispute settlement procedure at the WTO is formally initiated by a request 
for bilateral consultations between the member states concerned.8 The main purpose of holding 
consultations is for the parties concerned to try and resolve the dispute themselves before it 
reaches the litigation stage.9 Kristina pointed out that nearly half of all disputes in the WTO 
are usually settled at the consultations stage.10 However, if the consultations fail, the 
complaining party can request the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to establish an ad hoc panel 
 
1 Cosette Creamer ‘From the WTO’s crown jewel to its crown of thorns’ (2019) 113 AJIL Unbound at 51. 
2 Aarshi Tirkey The WTO Dispute Settlement System: An Analysis of India’s Experience and Current Reform 
Proposals (2019) at 9. 
3 Jens Lehne Crisis at the WTO: Is the Blocking of Appointments to the WTO Appellate Body by the United States 
Legally Justified? (2019) Carl Grossmann Verlag at 1. 
4 World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Activity: Some Figures, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispustats_e.htm, accessed on 15 October 2019. 
5 David Collins The World Trade Organization: A Beginner's Guide (2015) at 42. 
6 WTO WTO Dispute Settlement Body: Developments in 2016, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/carim318_e.htm, accessed on 14 March 2020.  
7 Linimose Anyiwe & Eghosa Ekhator ‘Developing countries and the WTO dispute resolution system: A legal 
assessment and review’ (2013) 2(1) AJOL at 124. 
8 WTO Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes: A Unique Contribution, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm, accessed on 3 October 2019. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Kristina Mitchell ‘Developing country success in WTO disputes’ (2013) 47 (1) Journal of World Trade at 78. 
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to assess the dispute.11 If an appeal is filed, it will be heard by the Appellate Body,12 whose 
members are appointed by the DSB through a consensus process.13 According to Smith, the 
Appellate Body is regarded as the highest adjudicative body in the WTO dispute settlement 
system and it has the final say in the review of all panel reports.14 
 
However, all the activities of the Appellate Body are currently suspended because it does not 
have enough members to review appeals.15 In terms of art 17.1 of the Understanding on Rules 
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (also known as the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, or DSU), a quorum of three Appellate Body members is required to establish 
a division to hear an appeal. On 10 December 2019, the term of office of Mr. Ujal Singh Bhatia 
and Mr. Thomas R. Graham, two of the three remaining members of the Appellate Body 
expired, leaving Ms. Hong Zhao, whose term ends on 30 November 2020.16 Discussions at 
several DSB meetings throughout 2019 to fill the six vacancies in the Appellate Body had 
proven fruitless,17 meanwhile, its docket continued to grow with complex pending appeals.18 
Tirkey argues that by the end of 2019 there were 13 appeals pending,19 with no clarification 




11 WTO Dispute Settlement: Appellate Body, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/appellate_body_e.htm, accessed on 5 November 2019. 
12 Ibid. 
13 James Bacchus & Simon Lester ‘The rule of precedent and the role of the Appellate Body’ (2020) 54(2) Journal 
of World Trade at 187. 
14 James McCall Smith ‘WTO dispute settlement: The politics of procedure in Appellate Body rulings’ (2003) 2 
(1) World Trade Review at 66. 
15 WTO Dispute Settlement: Members Urge Continued Engagement on Resolving Appellate Body Issues available 
at https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news19_e/dsb_18dec19_e.htm, accessed on 16 January 2020. 
16 Baker McKenzie Deadlock at the WTO Appellate Body: No Consensual Way out in Sight (2019), available at 
https://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2019/12/deadlock-at-wto-appellate-body, accessed on 
15 January 2020. 
17 WTO Annual Report (2020) at 119 available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/anrep20_chap6_e.pdf  accessed on 25 June 2020.  
18 Ujal Singh Bhatia Launch of the WTO Appellate Body's Annual Report for 2018, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_report_launch_e.htm, accessed on 12 January 2020. 
19 WTO ‘Dispute Settlement: Members reiterate joint call to launch selection process for Appellate Body 
members’, available at https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news19_e/dsb_22nov19_e.htm, accessed on 10 
January 2020.  
20 Aarshi Tirkey The WTO’s Appellate Body Crisis: Implication for Trade Rules and Multilateralism (2020), 
available at https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-wtos-appellate-body-crisis-implication-for-trade-rules-
and-multilateralism-60198/ accessed on 20 June 2020. 
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The Appellate Body crisis was instigated by the United States (US), one of the architect and 
most frequent user of the WTO dispute settlement system.21 Deepak argues that the US has 
been blocking the appointment of all members of the Appellate Body since 2017,22 due to 
several concerns over judicial activism on their part.23 For example, the Appellate Body is said 
to have frequently (a) breached the strict timelines for completing appeals; (b) permitted former 
members of the Appellate Body to hear pending appeals; (c) reviewed the facts of panels and 
the municipal law of member states; (d) issued advisory opinions; (e) treated its reports as 
binding precedent; and (f) issued erroneous interpretations of the covered agreements.24 
 
Although the US has outlined the above mentioned concerns at the WTO General Council and 
various DSB meetings, they were however, summarised in detail in the ‘2018 President’s 
Trade Policy Agenda’,25 and subsequently updated in the ‘2020 Report on the Appellate Body 
of the World Trade Organization’.26 In these above-mentioned reports, it was highlighted that 
for many years, multiple US administrations had raised several concerns about the Appellate 
Body’s failure to respect basic WTO rules.27 McDougall argued that these concerns were, 
however, elevated to new heights after the inauguration of the new US President, Donald 
Trump in January 2017.28 He also added that the escalation by the Trump administration 
‘reflects its scepticism about multilateralism in general and binding dispute settlement in 
particular, and its deep suspicion that global trade rules are increasingly stacked against US 
interests’.29 At the Senate Finance Committee in 2019, the United States Trade Representative 
(USTR) Mr Robert Lighthizer announced that the US was using the process of appointing new 
 
21 Amrita Bahri ‘Appellate body held hostage: Is judicial activism at fair trial?’ (2019) 53(2) Journal of World 
Trade at 294. 
22 Garima Deepak ‘WTO dispute settlement: the road ahead’ (2019) 51 International Law and Politics, at 982.  
23 Robert E Lighthizer Report on the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (2020) at 25, available at 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Report_on_the_Appellate_Body_of_the_World_Trade_Organization.pdf, 
accessed on 20 March 2020. 
24 Ibid 23 at 25–67. 
25 Robert E Lighthizer US President’s Trade Policy Agenda (2018), available at 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/2018/AR/2018%20Annual%20Report%20I.pdf,  accessed 
on 20 November 2019. 
26 Op cit note 23 at 25–118.  
27 Ibid note 23 at 13. 
28 Robert McDougall Crisis in the WTO: Restoring the WTO Dispute Settlement Function (2018) at 1, available 
at https://www.cigionline.org/publications/crisis-wto-restoring-dispute-settlement-function, accessed on 22 May 
2020. 
29 Ibid at 1. 
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members of the Appellate Body as the only leverage available to push for broader WTO 
reforms.30  
 
According to Tireky, some of the US’s concerns with the Appellate Body’s judicial functioning 
are widely shared by other WTO members,31 nevertheless they have criticised the country’s 
blocking tactic as inappropriate.32 Bown and Keynes argues that in November 2018, these 
WTO members had submitted several reform proposals in an attempt to address the US’s 
concerns.33 For example, they called for the amendment of the DSU rules to (a) create 
mechanisms to ensure that appeal proceedings are finished within 90 days unless the parties 
decide otherwise; (b) create transitioning rules that specify which cases outgoing Appellate 
Body members are allowed to stay on to complete them; (c) clarify that the legal issues that are 
subject to review do not include the review of panel’s factual findings and the municipal law 
of member states; (d) indicate that the review scope of the Appellate Body must only address 
the issues that were raised by the parties in a dispute;  and (e) organise annual meetings between 
the DSB and the Appellate Body to discuss systemic issues or trends in the WTO 
jurisprudence.34  
 
These proposals were, however, rejected by the US on the grounds that the longstanding 
concerns it raised about the Appellate Body’s functions were inadequately addressed.35 At the 
11th Ministerial Conference (MC11) in 2017, the USTR Mr Lighthizer told the other members 
that it was unnecessary to amend the DSU rules to permit what is clearly prohibited under the 
existing rules of the WTO.36 Instead, the Appellate Body should just adhere to the provisions 
 
30 Rob Davies The Politics of Trade in the Era of Hyperglobalisation: A Southern African Perspective 2019 at 49, 
available at https://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Bk_2019_The-Politics-of-Trade-in-the-
Era-of-Hyperglobalisation-A-Southern-African-Perspective_EN.pdf,  accessed on 23 May 2020. 
31 Tirkey op cit note 2 at 6-7. 
32 WTO WTO Members Debate Appointment/Reappointment of Appellate Body Members (2016), available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/dsb_23may16_e.htm, accessed on 20 June 2020. 
33 Chad Bown & Soumaya Keynes Why Trump Shot the Sheriffs: The End of WTO Dispute Settlement (2020) at 
18, available at https://www.piie.com/publications/working-papers/why-trump-shot-sheriffs-end-wto-dispute-
settlement-10, accessed on 20 June 2020.   
34 European Commission ‘WTO reform: EU proposes way forward on the functioning of the Appellate Body’ 
Press Release, 26 November 2018, available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_6529, accessed on 5 November 2019. 
35 U.S. Statements by the US at the WTO General Council meeting, December 12, 2018, available at 
https://geneva.usmission.gov/wp-
content/uploads/sites/290/Dec12.GC_.Stmt_.items_.7.and_.8.as_.delivered.clean_.pdf, accessed on 20 January 
2020. 
36 Robert Lighthizer Opening Plenary Statement of USTR Robert Lighthizer at the WTO Ministerial Conference, 
WT/MIN (17)/ST/128 (2017), available at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-
releases/2017/december/opening-plenary-statement-ustr, accessed on 12 January 2020.  
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of the DSU as agreed by the member states in 1995.37 At the same time, the USTR Mr 
Lighthizer also asked the members of the WTO to first collectively acknowledge that the 
Appellate Body has strayed from its limited mandate and to understand why it felt free to do 
so.38 In addition, he then proposed to the members of the WTO that a monitoring mechanism 
should be created within the dispute settlement system to ensure that the Appellate Body 
adheres to the written rules in the future.39 It remains uncertain in Geneva, however, as to what 
can be done to satisfy the US, especially since it rejected all the calls to suggest solutions.40 
 
In January 2019, the General Council appointed New Zealand ambassador David Walker as a 
facilitator charged with assisting the member states to find solutions to address the US’s 
concerns.41 A few months later, the ‘Draft General Council Decision on the Functioning of the 
Appellate Body Report’ was presented by ambassador Walker to the members of the WTO in 
which he outlined several concessions on how to address the US’s concerns.42 However, the 
report was heavily criticised by the US which argued that it failed to show that rest of the 
member states had reached a common understanding that the Appellate Body has contravened 
the basic rules of the WTO.43 Lehne argues that after realising the severity of the appointment 
crisis in the Appellate Body, a group of WTO members began to explore interim measures to 
try and save the appellate stage while permanent solutions to the crisis were sought in Geneva.44 
Some of these interim measures includ the (a) removal of the appellate review stage from the 
WTO dispute settlement system; (b) permitting the disputing parties to sign a ‘no appeal 
agreement’; (c) appointing new members of the Appellate Body through voting; (d) agreeing 





40 Lighthizer op cit note 23 at 121. 
41 WTO General Council Chair Appoints Facilitator to Address Disagreement on Appellate Body, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news19_e/gc_18jan19_e.htm, accessed on 20 January 2020. 
42 David Walker Informal Process on Matters Related to the Functioning of the Appellate Body, available at 
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/Jobs/GC/222.pdf, accessed on 20 February 
2020. 
43 Dennis Shea Statements Delivered to the General Council by Ambassador Dennis Shea, U.S. Permanent 
Representative to the World Trade Organization 15 October 2019, available at 
https://geneva.usmission.gov/2019/10/15/statements-by-the-united-states-at-the-wto-general-council-meeting 
accessed 15 September 2020. 
44 Lehne op cit note 3 at 27. 
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dispute settlement mechanisms available in the DSU; and (f) resolving appeals by using the 
arbitration process in the DSU.45  
1.1 Problem statement and argument advanced in this research 
According to art 17.2 of the DSU, all the members of the Appellate Body shall be appointed 
by the DSB to serve a four-year term with the possibility of being reappointed once. In addition, 
art 2.4 of the DSU provides that the DSB’s decision to appoint members of the Appellate Body 
shall be made by consensus. Consensus in the WTO is presumed to have been reached ‘if no 
Member, present at the meeting of the DSB when the decision is taken, formally objects to the 
proposed decision’.46 Similarly, art 17.2 of the DSU requires that the vacancies in the Appellate 
Body should be filled by the DSB whenever it becomes necessary. However, the DSB has 
failed to fill the existing six vacancies in the Appellate Body because of the US’s refusal to 
consent to the appointment process since 2017.47 Lehne also adds that the reform proposals 
that have been submitted by several WTO members to overcome the crisis in the Appellate 
Body have also failed to persuade the US to cooperate.48 Instead, the US has announced on 
numerous occasions that it will not lift the veto on the appointment of Appellate Body members 
unless its concerns have been adequately addressed by the member states.49  
 
While numerous studies have discussed the Appellate Body crisis and the implications it has 
for the WTO dispute settlement system. Few, however, have critically analysed the validity of 
the reasons provided by the US for blocking the appointment process in the Appellate Body. 
Similarly, most of the reform proposals that have been tabled in Geneva so far have failed to 
question whether the US’s concerns are well founded.50 Therefore, the purpose of this research 
is to critically analyse these concerns to determine if the Appellate Body has breached its 
limited mandate, as set out in the WTO rules. The research will demonstrate that many of the 
US’s concerns could be argued to have some credibility and that they are widely shared by 
other WTO members. However, the approach taken by the US is not constructive and it fails 
to resolve the main source of the problem – being the failure of the WTO’s negotiating function 
 
45 Clifford Chance The WTO Appellate Body: A Way Forward? (2019) at 6, available at 
https://www.cliffordchance.com/content/dam/cliffordchance/briefings/2019/11/the-wto-appellate-body-crisis-a-
way-forward.pdf, accessed on 21 January 2020. 
46 WTO, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 1994, Footnote 1. 
47 Deepak op cit note 22 at 982.  
48 Lehne, op cit note 3 at 26.  
49 Ibid  at 2. 
50 Weihuan Zhou & Henry Gao ‘Overreaching’ or ‘overreacting’? Reflections on the judicial function and 
approaches of WTO Appellate Body (2019) 53(6) Journal of World Trade at 2.  
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to complete the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations to update the rules to reflect the 
current state of the global economy. It is further held that besides the Trade Facilitation 
Agreement (TFA) which came into effect in 2017, the WTO’s rulebook has not been updated 
since 1995.51 In addition, this research will provide recommendations to save the appellate 
review stage while permanent solutions to the crisis are sought by the member states. 
1.2 Research question 
The main research question is: Why is the US vetoing the appointment of Appellate Body 
members and whether these longstanding concerns raised are valid? 
In engaging with the above research question, the following additional research questions are 
discussed:  
• What is the Appellate Body? 
• What is the history of the WTO dispute settlement system? 
• What is the crisis in the Appellate Body and the potential implications it has for the 
WTO dispute settlement system? 
• Why is the US vetoing the selection process of appointing members of the Appellate 
Body? 
• Whether these longstanding concerns raised by the US are valid? 
• What are the reform proposals that have been submitted by the member states and 
whether they are practical? 
• How can the Appellate Body impasse be bypassed while permanent solutions are 
sought by the members states? 
 
1.3 Research objectives 
The primary objectives of this research are to explain: Why is the US vetoing the appointment 
of Appellate Body members and whether these longstanding concerns raised are valid? 
Specific research objectives are to: 
• Define the Appellate Body.  
 
51 James Nedumpara & Prakhar Bhardwaj The Crisis in the WTO Appellate Body: Implications for India and the 
Multilateral Trading System (2019) at 3, available at 
https://ctil.org.in/cms/docs/Papers/Discussion/discussion6.pdf, accessed on 22 June 2020.   
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• Trace the historical development of the WTO dispute settlement system. 
• Discuss the crisis in the Appellate Body and its implications for the WTO dispute 
settlement system. 
• Explain why the US is vetoing the selection process of appointing members of the 
Appellate Body. 
• Critically analyse whether these longstanding concerns raised by the US are valid. 
• Discuss the reform proposals that have been submitted by the member states and 
explain whether they are practical. 
• Propose recommendations on how the Appellate Body impasse could be bypassed until 
permanent solutions are sought by the member states. 
 
1.4 Importance of and justifications for the research 
This research is significant because the collapse of the Appellate Body does not mean that the 
WTO dispute settlement system has entirely broken down.52 Instead, ad hoc panels continue to 
assess trade disputes and the member states rights to appeal panel reports are still intact. 
However, this means that any party in the dispute can block the dispute settlement process by 
filing an appeal which will be left in limbo for an indefinite period. The notice of appeal that 
was filed by the US in December 2019 against a panel ruling that had found that the tariffs it 
imposed on Indian steel products were inconsistent with WTO agreements, illustrates how a 
member state can leverage the Appellate Body crisis in its favour.53 In addition, art 16.4 of the 
DSU provides that appealed panel reports shall not be considered for adoption by the DSB 
unless they have been concluded by the members of the Appellate Body.54 This means that the 
country which won the dispute at the panel stage cannot claim the value of its winnings while 
the appeal remains unresolved. In practical terms, however, Hillman argues that there is no 
country in the WTO that is likely to wait for the appeal to be finalised while knowing that there 
 
52 Anabel González & Euijin Jung ‘Developing countries can help restore the WTO’s dispute settlement system’ 
(2020) PB20-1 Peterson Institute for International Economics Policy Brief at 1. 
53 WTO ‘Dispute settlement: United States notifies decision to appeal compliance panel ruling in steel dispute 
with India’ (2020) WTO News, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/ds436oth_17jan20_e.htm, accessed on 20 January 2020. 
54 Geraldo Vidigal ‘Living without the Appellate Body: Multilateral, bilateral and plurilateral solutions to the 
WTO dispute settlement crisis’ (2019) 20 Journal of World Investment & Trade at 870. 
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is no Appellate Body division to hear that appeal.55 In fact, most countries will disregard the 
rules of the WTO and impose retaliatory measures to protect their trade interests.56  
 
The WTO’s credibility as a reputable organization for multilateral trade is derived from its 
ability to enforce the commitments that the member states had agreed to.57 However, in the 
absence of a reliable enforcement mechanism in the WTO, it is believed that the member states 
would be reluctant to negotiate new rules if existing ones cannot be enforced due to the 
imminent blocking of panel rulings.58 Schott and Jung also claims that the US is risking both 
the ongoing and prospective trade negotiations in the WTO on new rules for issues such as 
fisheries, digital trade, subsidies and others which are important for the US economy to 
flourish.59 In addition, the US’s actions are deemed to be undermining its ability to use the 
WTO dispute settlement system to defend its rights and trade interests against inconsistent 
trading practices of non-market economies members such as China.60 
 
The legalisation of the WTO dispute settlement system at the end of the Uruguay Round 
negotiations was intended to provide a fair dispute resolution system to which all the member 
states would have access to, regardless of their political or economic status.61 Scholars such as 
Ismail argue however, that the collapse of the Appellate Body will adversely harm the 
economic prospects of many developing countries, particularly those who lack the economic 
power to either enforce their rights or to protect their trade interests.62 Even though existing 
data shows that the participation of most developing countries in the system remains very low, 
however, over 80 per cent of all disputes in the WTO have involved either one high-income 
country or one low-income country.63 Amaral Jr, de Oliveira Sá Pires and Lucena Carneiro 
also contend that ‘developing countries rely on the findings and recommendations of the 
 
55 Jennifer Hillman ‘Three approaches to fixing the World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body: The good, the 
bad and the ugly? (2018) Institute of International Economic Law at 2. 
56 Ibid. 
57 WTO ‘Appellate Body impasse communication from the African Group’ (2019) Trilac WT/GC/W/776 at 1, 
available at https://www.tralac.org/news/article/14119-appellate-body-impasse-communication-from-the-
african-group-to-the-wto-general-council.html, accessed on 10 January 2020. 
58 Jeffrey Schott & Euijin Jung ‘The WTO’s existential crisis: How to salvage its ability to settle trade disputes’ 
(2019) PB19-19, Peterson Institute for International Economics Policy Briefs at 2. 
59 Ibid 58 at 2. 
60 Ibid at 2. 
61 Mitchell op cit note 10 at 81. 
62 Faizel Ismail WTO Reform and the Crisis of Multilateralism: A Developing Country Perspective (2020) at 1, 
available at https://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Bk_2020_WTO-reform-and-the-crisis-of-
multilateralism_EN.pdf, accessed on 4 September 2020.  
63 Danish Kwa & Aileen Kwa ‘Crisis at the WTO’s Appellate Body (AB): Why the AB is important for developing 
members’ (2019) South Centre Policy Brief 69 at 3. 
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Appellate Body to have legitimacy for discussing the terms of implementation with the 
violating member’.64  
 
This research is also significant because it seeks to contribute to the ongoing discussions on 
the possible ways to resolve the Appellate Body crisis. As discussed above, the US has rejected 
all the reform proposals that were submitted by several WTO members since the onset of the 
impasse in 2017.65 In addition, the US did so without submitting its own counter reform 
proposal each time when it was requested by the other members to do so.66 Scholars such as 
Lehne believe that as long as the US’s interests remain unknown to the other member states, 
the negotiations efforts to reform the WTO dispute settlement system and resolve the Appellate 
Body crisis will remain unsuccessful.67    
1.5 Research scope and limitations 
The scope of this research focuses on the reform of the WTO dispute settlement system and 
the concerns raised by the US for blocking the appointment of Appellate Body members since 
2017. Prominent scholars such as Ismail have highlighted that the recent reform debates about 
the WTO dispute settlement system in Geneva were led by the US.68 At MC11 in 2017, the 
USTR Mr Lighthizer raised concerns about the imbalance between the WTO’s negotiation and 
litigation functions.69 He argued that some member states believed that they could secure 
concessions through litigation which they would not get through multilateral trade 
negotiations.70 In addition, the USTR Mr Lighthizer requested the member states to consider 
whether the current litigation structure of the WTO disputes settlement system was rational.71 
 
In addition, this research also recognises that the concerns raised by the US about the Appellate 
Body’s judicial conduct form part of its broader WTO reform proposals.72 Ismail states that the 
US’s broader WTO reform proposals have been categorised by the European Union (EU) as 
 
64Alberto do Amaral Júnior, Luciana Maria de Oliveira Sá Pires, Cristiane Lucena Carneiro The WTO Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism: A Developing Country Perspective 2019 Springer: Brazil at 5.  
65 WTO ‘General Council: Minutes of the meeting of 12 December 2018’ 20 February 2019 WTO News, available 
at https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news18_e/sum_gc_dec18_e.htm, accessed on 24 June 2020. 
66 Deepak op cit note 22 at 990. 
67 Lehne op cit note 3 at 26. 
68 Ismail op cit note 62 at 11. 






follows: ‘Special & Differential Treatment (S&DT), Rule-making (procedural and 
substantive), Regular work and transparency’.73 First, the US would like the meaning and 
criteria of what constitutes developing country status in the WTO to be clarified,74 so that 34 
developing countries that are relatively advanced, wealthy and influential may be excluded 
from their current developing country status.75 Waddoups states that in 2019, the US 
announced that any country that was a member of or had initiated accession into the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OCED), a member of the Group 
of 20 (G20), classified as a high-income country by the World Bank (WB), and accounted for 
more than 0.5 per cent of world trade should be prohibited from claiming S&DT in current and 
future trade negotiations.76 Second, the US proposed that the consensus approach should be 
abandoned in favour of plurilateral negotiations because it has proven difficult to attain 
consensus among the WTO’s 164 members.77 As a solution, the US recommended that for 
instance, in circumstances where a significant number of like-minded member states agree to 
adopt an issue that has not yet been agreed upon by all, those member states should be allowed 
to advance the issue and subsequently extend the benefits to others on a most-favoured-nation 
(MFN) basis.78 Third, the US has argued that the WTO was not well equipped to handle the 
challenges caused by non-market economies members such as China which fails to respect 
basic principles such as non-discrimination, market access, reciprocity, fairness and 
transparency.79 As a solution, the US suggested that penalties should be imposed against WTO 
members that fail to comply with the transparency and notification obligations when they adopt 
new trade policies.80 In addition, the US’s proposal encourages the member states to submit 
counter-notifications on the trade regimes of other member states to the WTO Secretariat.81 
   
 
 
73 Ismail op cit note 62 at 4. 
74 Lighthizer op cit note 36. 
75 Chen Fengying & Sun Lipeng ‘The United States' role in WTO reform’ (2019) 76 China International Studies 
at 92. 
76 Madeleine Waddoups ‘Quantifying “Developing Nation” for International Trade’ (2019) 18 Center for Strategic 
& International Studies, available at https://www.csis.org/quantifying-developing-nation-international-trade, 
accessed on 30 July 2020.  
77 Op cit note 75 at 96. 
78 Lighthizer op cit note 36. 
79 Op cit note 25 at 20. 
80 Markus Wagner ‘The impending demise of the WTO Appellate Body: From centrepiece to historical relic?’ in 
Chang-fa LoJunji NakagawaTsai-fang Chen (ed) The Appellate Body of the WTO and Its Reform, (2020) at 73. 
81 WTO ‘WTO members consider transparency reforms at Goods Council meeting’ WTO News January 2019, 
available at https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news19_e/good_10jul19_e.htm, accessed on 20 July 2020.  
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1.6 Research methodology 
The research is literature based, and the methodology adopted is an analytical approach. This 
approach will be used to critically analyse existing literature on the subject matter. Both 
primary and secondary literature sources will be used. For example, the legal texts of the 
covered agreements such as the DSU, GATT 1947 among others will be used as primary 
sources. Secondary sources will include panel reports and the Appellate Body reports (WTO 
jurisprudence or cases); WTO annual reports and the Appellate Body annual reports; minutes 
of the DSB meetings, statements and speeches made by WTO members as well as senior 
officials of the WTO; scholarly books; journal articles; research reports drafted by trade law 
experts and research organisations such as the Consumer Unity & Trust Society (CUTS 
International), the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the office of the 
United States Trade Representative (USTR), among others. 
1.7 Structure of the research  
The research is divided into five chapters:  
Chapter 1 is the introductory chapter that includes but is not limited to the background, 
research problem, research questions and objectives, research scope and outlines the chapters 
of the research.  
Chapter 2 provides a historical overview of the WTO dispute settlement system and highlights 
some of the key features that were introduced by the member states at the end of the Uruguay 
Round negotiations. 
Chapter 3 discusses the concerns that the US has raised about the Appellate Body’s failure to 
respect the rules of the WTO. These concerns have been divided into procedural and 
substantive issues. 
Chapter 4 is an academic attempt to critically analyse the merits of the US’s concerns. Several 
Appellate Body reports that have been issued since the WTO’s establishment will be used as 
case studies to support the arguments.  
Chapter 5 concludes the research and summarises the findings of the previous chapters. It also 
offers recommendations to bypass the Appellate Body crisis and ensure that appeals are 
resolved while permanent solutions are sought by the member states. 
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Chapter 2: The origins of the WTO dispute settlement system 
2. Introduction 
The previous chapter provided the background of the Appellate Body crisis and highlighted its 
impact on the WTO dispute settlement system. This chapter traces the historical trajectory of 
the WTO dispute settlement system. It will demonstrate that prior to the establishment of the 
WTO in 1995, trade disputes were governed by two provisions of the GATT 1947, but the 
dispute settlement system had several weaknesses which compelled the contracting parties to 
take measures into their own hands. The end of the Uruguay Round in 1994 resulted in a 
binding and compulsory state-to-state dispute settlement mechanism with powerful 
adjudicative bodies such as the Appellate Body. However, despite these achievements, the 
WTO dispute settlement system continues to face challenges that threatens to undermine its 
viability.  
2.1  The GATT 1947 dispute settlement system 
The WTO dispute settlement system is considered as one of the most important innovations of 
the Uruguay Round negotiations.82 However, this does not mean that its predecessor, the 
GATT 1947,  did not have a dispute settlement system.83 In contrast, the WTO dispute 
settlement system is based on the experience of the dispute settlement system that existed under 
GATT 1947 which provided a backbone for the multilateral trading system for almost five 
decades after the Second World War (WW II) in the 1940s.84 For example, art 3.1 of the DSU 
provides that the ‘[M]embers affirm their adherence to the principles for the management of 
disputes heretofore applied under Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1947, and the rules and 
procedures as further elaborated and modified herein’. 
 
According to Waincymer, the main aim of the GATT 1947 dispute settlement system was to 
‘restore the balance of advantages between the parties’.85 However, GATT 1947 was not an 
international organisation for trade per se and it did not provide for an elaborative dispute 
 
82 WTO Dispute Settlement System Training Module: Chapter 2: Historic Development of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c2s1p1_e.htm, accessed on 12 February 
2020. 
83  Ibid. 
84 Bown & Keynes op cit note 33 at 1.  
85 Jeffrey Waincymer ‘GATT dispute settlement: An agenda for evaluation and reform’ (1985) 14(1) North 
Carolina Journal of International Law at 85. 
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settlement system.86 In fact, trade disputes at the time were settled on the basis of arts XXII 
and XXIII of GATT 1947.87 According to para 1 of art XXII of GATT 1947, each contracting 
party was required to ‘afford adequate opportunity for consultation on any matter raised 
pertaining to this agreement’. In other words, the contracting parties were required to have 
consultations first before bringing the matter to a panel of experts for adjudication.88 If the 
consultations failed to resolve the matter, art XXIII of GATT 1947 permitted the complaining 
contracting party to request the establishment of a panel to investigate and issue a ruling.89 
However, in the early years of the GATT 1947 dispute settlement system, disputes were heard 
by the Chairman of the GATT Council.90 Later, they were brought to the working parties 
composed of government representatives who adopted the reports by positive consensus.91 
From the 1950s, the working parties were replaced by a panel of independent experts whose 
issued reports were submitted to the GATT Council for approval.92 Jackson, Hudec and Davis 
stated that those reports could only become binding after they had been approved by the GATT 
Council through positive consensus.93 
 
For many decades, the GATT 1947 dispute settlement system proved to be successful in 
resolving trade disputes between the contracting parties.94 For example, a total of 132 panel 
reports were issued and only 101 were adopted under the GATT 1947 dispute settlement 
system.95 Hudec argues that the initial success could have been attributed to the willingness 
among the disputants to resolve their differences amicably even if it meant having to 
compromise.96 Its effectiveness was, however, frustrated by several weaknesses particularly 
around the 1980s and the 1990s.97 First, it was the requirement of positive consensus from all 
 
86 Gerd Droesse Membership in international Organizations: Paradigms of Membership Structures, Legal 
Implications of Membership and the Concept of International Organization (2020) T.M.C. Asser Press at 277. 
87 Mitsuo Matsushita, Thomas Schoenbaum, Petros Mavroidis et al The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice 
and Policy 3 ed (2015) at 86. 
88 David Palmeter & Petros Mavroidis Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization: Practice and 
Procedure 2nd ed (2004) Cambridge University Press at 7. 
89 Ibid at 7–8. 
90 WTO op cit note 82.  
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
93 John Jackson, Robert Hudec & Donald Davis ‘The role and effectiveness of the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism’ (2000) Brookings Trade Forum at 183. 
94 Peter van den Bossche & Werner Zdouc The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and 
Materials 4th ed (2017) Cambridge University Press at 159. 
95 Elin Østebø Johansen WTO Dispute Settlement Body Developments in 2011, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/speech_johansen_13mar12_e.htm, accessed on 20 February 2020. 
96 Robert Hudec ‘The new WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An overview of the first three years’ (1999) 8(1) 
Minnesota Journal of International Law at 5–6.  
97 WTO op cit note 82. 
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the contracting parties at every stage of the dispute settlement.98 These stages included the 
decision on the establishment of a panel, the adoption of a panel report and the authorisation 
of retaliation.99 This meant that each contracting party, as well as the defendant to the dispute, 
could block any of the stages in the dispute settlement process by voting against the request.100 
Second, the system had no strict time limits for the panel proceedings,101 and that caused 
several disputes to drag on inconclusively for many years.102 Third, the system had no ‘legally 
binding enforcement powers’.103 This meant that compliance with the panel rulings depended 
a lot on the political will of the contracting parties.104 Lehne argues that these above-mentioned 
difficulties eventually became a major problem for the US particularly around the 1980s and 
early 1990s.105 The US resorted to imposing unilateral trade sanctions under the s 301 of the 
Trade Act of 1974 (Section 301) to safeguards its trade interests, which in turn angered its 
trading partners.106 
2.2 The Uruguay Round negotiations and the establishment of the DSU  
The Uruguay Round was the 8th round of multilateral trade negotiations conducted under the 
auspices of GATT 1947.107 It was launched in 1986 by 123 contracting parties in Punta del 
Este, Uruguay.108 Young states that the improvement and strengthening of the rules and 
procedures of the GATT 1947 dispute settlement system was one of the key objectives among 
the trade negotiators during the round.109 The trade negotiators had also agreed that the agenda 
would include the establishment of a monitoring and evaluation mechanism to facilitate 
compliance with the adopted recommendations.110 Vidigal argues however, that developed 
countries such as the US had pressured for the establishment of a binding and enforceable 
dispute settlement system.111 The Uruguay Round negotiations were successfully concluded in 
 
98 Ibid.  
99 Ibid. 
100 Van den Bossche & Zdouc op cit note 94 at 159. 
101 WTO op cit note 8.  
102 Ibid. 
103 Hudec op cit note 96 at 10. 
104 WTO op cit note 82 at 103. 
105 Lehne op cit note 3 at 1. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Sada Saxena ‘The Uruguay Round: Expectations of developing countries’ (1988) 23(6) Intereconomics at 269. 
108 WTO Understanding the WTO: Basics: The Uruguay Round, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm, accessed on 16 February 2020. 
109 Michael Young ‘Dispute resolution in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers triumph over diplomats’ (1995) 29(2) The 
International Lawyer at 389. 
110 GATT Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round (1986), at 7, available at 
https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/91240152.pdf, accessed on 20 February 2020.  
111 Vidigal op cit note 54 at 865. 
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in 1993,112 and they brought about an adjudicatory, effective and a rule-oriented system to 
resolve trade disputes,113 that was embodied in the DSU.114 The DSU is contained in Annex 2 
of the WTO Agreement and it introduced several key institutional changes that addressed some 
of the concerns that existed in the previous dispute settlement system. Each of these changes 
are summarised below. 
2.2.1 Single and integrated dispute settlement system 
The DSU established a single and integrated dispute settlement system that applies to all 
disputes arising under any of the covered agreements listed in Appendix 1 of the DSU.115 These 
covered agreements consist of the DSU itself, the WTO Agreement, the GATT 1947 and the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), among others.116 However, the application 
of the DSU is subject to the ‘special and additional rules and procedures’ on dispute settlement 
that are contained in the covered agreements.117 According to the WTO, the ‘special and 
additional rules and procedures’ are the specific rules and procedures that are ‘designed to deal 
with the particularities of disputes under a specific covered agreement’.118  
2.2.2 Compulsory and exclusive jurisdiction 
The jurisdiction of the WTO dispute settlement system is exclusive and compulsory in 
nature.119 Article 23 of the DSU provides that if a member state believes that the actions of 
another member state has violated any of the covered agreements, that member state is 
prohibited from using other fora to resolve a WTO related dispute.120 This means that all the 
member states are subject to the dispute settlement system because they signed and ratified the 
WTO Agreement as a single undertaking at the time of accession.121 In addition, the WTO 
dispute settlement system guarantees equal access to all member states regardless of their 
 
112 WTO The Uruguay Round, available at https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm,  
accessed on 20 February 2020. 
113  Young op cit note 109 at 396. 
114 WTO Dispute Settlement System Training Module: Chapter 1: Introduction to the WTO dispute settlement 
system, available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c1s2p1_e.htm, accessed 
on 24 February 2019. 
115 DSU art 1.1. 
116 WTO Legal basis for a dispute available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c4s1p1_e.htm, accessed on 25 June 2020. 
117 DSU art 1.2 and Appendix 2. 
118  WTO op cit note 114.  
119 WTO Secretariat A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System 2 ed (2017) Cambridge University Press 
at 16. 
120 Ibid at 16. 
121 Ibid at 16–17. 
17 
 
economic or political status.122 In United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, the panel ruled that access to the WTO dispute settlement process was limited 
to the member states only.123 However, the ruling was overturned by the Appellate Body when 
it held that non-state actors (such as individuals, companies and international organisations) 
with strong interests in the matter can request permission to file amicus curiae submissions.124  
2.2.3 The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 
The DSU created a political body known as the DSB. Paine state that the DSB is comprised of 
the representatives of all the members of the WTO and they administer the rules and procedures 
embodied in the DSU.125 In addition, the DSB has the authority to establish panels, adopt panel 
and Appellate Body reports, appoint new members of the Appellate Body, monitor and 
implement rulings, and to authorise the suspension of concessions for failure to comply with 
the issued rulings or recommendations.126 
2.2.4 The negative or reverse consensus decision-making rule 
The DSU replaced the positive consensus decision-making rule that was required at every stage 
of the GATT 1947 dispute settlement system with negative or reverse consensus.127 First, the 
DSU provides that a panel shall be established if a request is made by a complaining party 
unless the DSB decides by consensus not to establish it.128 Second, the DSU provides that if 
an appeal is not filed by either of the parties, the panel report must be adopted by the DSB 
unless the DSB decides to vote against it.129 Third, if an appeal is filed, the DSU provides that 
the Appellate Body report must be adopted by the DSB unless it decides by consensus not to 
adopt it.130 In a nutshell, the rule of negative or reverse consensus in the system has guaranteed 
the establishment of a panel when requested as well as the automatic adoption of panel or 
Appellate Body reports once they have been placed on the DSB’s agenda.  
 
 
122 Ibid at 17. 
123 Appellate Body Report United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, para 101. 
124 WTO Participation in Dispute Settlement Proceedings, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c9s3p1_e.htm, accessed on 20 February 
2020.  
125 Joshua Paine ‘The functions of the WTO's dispute settlement body: A distinctive voice mechanism’ (2018) 
Social Science Research Network at 2.  
126 DSU art 2.1. 
127 Tirkey op cit note 2 at 9. 
128 DSU art 6.1. 
129 DSU art 16.4. 
130 DSU art 17.14. 
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2.2.5 The establishment of the Appellate Body review 
Although the Appellate Body was not thought of initially, it was designed to be a safety 
measure to prevent the automatic adoption of legally flawed panel reports.131 Bacchus and 
Simon argue that at the time of its establishment, the members of the WTO had expected that 
appeals would be minimal and narrow in scope.132 However, the demand of appeals turned out 
to be much higher than what was initially expected.133 For example, between 1995 and 2014 
an average of 66.85 per cent of the disputes were appealed but later increased to almost 90 per 
cent in 2016.134  
2.2.6 Establishment of strict time frames for concluding disputes 
The DSU sets out strict timeframes for each stage of the of the WTO dispute settlement 
process.135 For example, art 4.7 of the DSU allocates 60 days for the consultations procedure, 
art 12.9 of the DSU requires that panel reports should be issued within six months of the panel’s 
composition, but not later than nine months and art 17.2 of the DSU requires that Appellate 
Body reports should be issued within 60 days of an appeal but no later than 90 days in 
exceptional circumstances.  
2.2.7 Establishment of a mechanism to ensure compliance with rulings 
The reluctance among the contracting parties to follow the recommendations of the panel 
reports after they had been adopted was one of the major weaknesses of the GATT 1947 dispute 
settlement system.136 Young argues that the DSU has created rules that encourage a respondent 
to comply with decisions or rulings while the aggrieved party is authorized to withdraw the 
relevant concessions against the non-complying member if it wishes to do so.137 According to 
the WTO, the purpose of retaliation is to compel the respondent to bring its inconsistent 
 
131 Bahri op cit note 21 at 294. 
132 James Bacchus & Simon Lester ‘The rule of precedent and the role of the Appellate Body’ (2020) 54(2) Journal 
of World Trade at 186. 
133 Ibid. 
134  Elvire Fabry & Erik Tate ‘Saving the WTO Appellate Body or Returning to the Wild West of Trade?’ (2018) 
at 5, available at http://institutdelors.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/SavingtheWTOAppellateBody-FabryTate-
June2018.pdf, accessed on 2 May 2020. 
135 WTO ‘Introduction to the WTO dispute settlement system’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c1s3p3_e.htm accessed on 20 February 
2020. 




measure in line with the rules of the WTO.138 In addition, the DSU requires that retaliation 
ought to have been approved by the DSB before it can be applied.139  
 
2.3 The institutions of the WTO dispute settlement process 
In general, the primary participants in the WTO dispute settlement process are the member 
states, acting as parties and third parties to a case.140 Van den Bossche and Zdouc state that 
there are several bodies that are involved in the WTO dispute settlement process and they 
include the DSB, panels and the Appellate Body.141  
2.3.1 The DSB  
As already mentioned above, the DSB is a political body and the alter ego of the WTO General 
Council.142 According to the WTO Agreement, the General Council convenes as the DSB to 
oversee the rules and procedures contained in the DSU.143 The DSB has exclusive authority to 
‘determine panels, adopt panel and the Appellate Body reports, monitor the implementation of 
rulings, recommendations, and to authorise suspension of concessions and other obligations 
under the covered agreements’.144 In addition, the DSB has authority to appoint new Appellate 
Body members,145 and to adopt the rules of conduct for the WTO dispute settlement system.146  
 
Article 2.4 of the DSU provides that the decisions of the DSB must always be taken by 
consensus. When, however, the DSB establishes panels, adopts the panel or the Appellate Body 
reports or authorises retaliation, the DSU requires the decision to be taken by reverse or 
negative consensus.147 The DSU also requires the DSB to meet as often as necessary to fulfil 
its functions and to also meet the timeframes provided for in the DSU.148 In practice, the DSB 
has one regular meeting each month while special meetings are only convened by the Director-
 
138 WTO The WTO at Twenty: Challenges and Achievements (2015) World Trade Organization at 64, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wto_at_twenty_e.htm, accessed on 3 July 2020. 
139 DSU art 22.2. 
140 Op cit note 114. 
141 Van den Bossche & Werner Zdouc op cit note 94 at 205. 
142 Van den Bossche The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and Materials 2nd ed 
(2012) Cambridge University Press at 15. 
143 WTO Agreement op cit note 46 art IV:2; DSU art 2.1. 
144 DSU art 2.1. 
145 DSU art 17.2. 
146 WTO Dispute Settlement System Training Module: Chapter 3:  WTO Bodies Involved in the dispute settlement 
process, available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c3s1p1_e.htm, 
accessed on 22 February 2020.  
147 DSU arts 6.1, 16.4, 17.14 and 22.6. 
148 DSU art 2.3. 
20 
 
General whenever requested by members.149 In addition, the DSU provides that the DSB shall 
receive administrative support from the WTO Secretariat.150 
2.3.2 The panels 
Panels are the ‘quasi-judicial bodies’ that adjudicate disputes between member states in the 
first instance.151 They are established by the DSB at the request of a complaining party to a 
dispute unless there is consensus not to take the decision.152 According to the DSU, panels are 
responsible for making an objective assessment of the factual and legal aspect of a case and to 
submit its findings and conclusions contained in a report to the DSB for approval.153 Moreover, 
panels are normally composed of three to five panellists that are selected on an ad hoc basis.154 
This means that there are no permanent panel members in the WTO but a different panel is 
established whenever a dispute arises.155  
 
Article 8.1 of the DSU provides that anyone who is independent and qualified is potentially 
eligible to serve as a panellist. In addition, panellists shall be composed of well-qualified 
government or non-governmental persons who have published widely on international trade 
law or policy.156 However, the number of lawyers and academics that are serving as panellists 
has been increasing over the past few years.157 According to the DSU, the WTO Secretariat 
keeps an ‘indicative list’ of names from which potential panellists may be drawn.158 Moreover, 
the members of the WTO are allowed to propose names to be included in the indicative list and 
that has always been approved without problems.159 However, citizens of member states whose 
governments are parties to the dispute cannot serve on a panel related to that dispute unless the 
parties decide otherwise.160 Panel members are required to be independent of their member 
states while the member states themselves are banned from influencing the panel’s functions.161  
 
149 WTO op cit note 146.  
150 DSU art 27.1. 
151 WTO op cit note 146.  
152 DSU art 6.1. 
153 DSU art 11. 
154 DSU art 8.5. 
155 WTO op cit note 146. 
156 DSU art 8.1. 
157 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Dispute Settlement 2003 at 9, available at 
https://unctad.org/en/Docs/edmmisc232add17_en.pdf, accessed on 24 August 2020. 
158 DSU art 8.4. 
159 WTO op cit note 146.  
160 DSU art 8.3. 
161 DSU art 8.9. 
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2.3.3 Appellate Body 
Smit argues that the Appellate Body is not an official international court for trade but a 
permanent tribunal exercising ‘quasi-judicial’ functions.162 It is comprised of seven members 
(who are known as judges) that are appointed by the DSB to hear appeals from the panel 
proceedings.163 However, a quorum of three Appellate Body members is required to serve on 
each case and they must do so in rotation.164 Article 17.1 of the DSU provides that the rotation 
is determined in the Working Procedures for Appellate Review. In addition, the members of 
the Appellate Body have been appointed are expected to serve a four-year term and each 
person’s term may only be renewed once.165 However, the possibility of being reappointed by 
the DSB is not guaranteed. 
 
The DSU requires that the membership of the Appellate Body must be comprised of persons 
with recognised authority, as experts in law, international trade or any other related subject 
matter of the WTO covered agreements.166 However, most of the Appellate Body members so 
far have been persons who were judges, occupied senior positions in government, or were 
practising lawyers and university professors.167 However, these judges are not full-time 
employees of the WTO but travel to Geneva when it is necessary to decide an appeal.168 The 
DSU requires that the membership of the Appellate Body should be ‘broadly representative of 
the membership in the WTO and that the members should not be affiliated with any 
government.169 
 
Typically, an appeal in the WTO can only be initiated by any of the parties to a dispute. This 
means that the member states that participated as third parties at the panel proceedings are 
prohibited from filing appeals. In addition, the DSU provides that ‘an appeal is limited to the 
legal aspects covered in the panel reports and the legal interpretation that was developed in 
those reports’.170 According to art 17.13, the members of the Appellate Body have the authority 
to ‘uphold, modify, or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the panels that were 
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appealed’. In addition, the recommendations and rulings provided by the Appellate Body 
cannot add to nor diminish any rights provided in covered agreements.171 For example, the 
members of the Appellate Body are not supposed to engage in judicial activism such as issuing 
advisory opinions on issues that were not raised in appeals or crucial in resolving the appeal.172  
2.3.4 Other entities involved in the WTO dispute settlement system 
In addition to the above-mentioned bodies, there are other institutions and individuals that are 
involved in the WTO dispute settlement system.173 These institutions and individuals include 
the chair of the DSB,174 the WTO Director-General,175 arbitrators,176 experts,177 expert review 
groups,178 technical experts groups,179 the permanent group of experts,180 and the facilitator.181 
2.4 The WTO dispute settlement process 
As discussed in chapter 1, trade disputes in the WTO can be settled in two main ways, namely 
bilateral consultations between the governments concerned or through adjudication by the 
panels or the Appellate Body (if appealed).182 The WTO dispute settlement process under the 
DSU comprises three main stages, namely consultations, adjudication and the implementation 
of the rulings.183  
2.4.1 Consultations  
The WTO dispute settlement process is always initiated with a formal request for consultations 
by the government of a member state regarding complaints made against another government 
of a member state.184 The purpose of holding consultations is for the governments concerned 
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to try to resolve the dispute themselves before they advance to the adjudicative stage.185 
Jackson, Hudec and Davis argued that the consultations were designed to provide an 
opportunity for the parties involved to clarify the facts, to understand the nature of the 
complaint and for each to explain their positions in the matter.186  
2.4.2 Adjudication  
If the consultations failed to resolve the matter in dispute, the complainant may request the 
DSB to establish an ad hoc panel to assess the dispute.187 In terms of art 6.1 of the DSU, when 
a request for the establishment of a panel has been made by a complainant, the DSB has no 
choice but to approve it unless there is consensus to do otherwise. Following the DSB’s 
approval of the complainants request to establish a panel, the terms of reference of the panel 
will then be drawn up.188 As already discussed above, panels are normally composed of three 
to five panellists who are selected on an ad hoc basis.189 The DSU provides that each of the 
panel members are selected from the Secretariat’s indicative list.190 However, if the parties 
cannot agree, the WTO Director-General may be asked to select appropriate panellists on their 
behalf.191 The DSU provides that the function of a panel is to make an objective assessment to 
determine whether the challenged measure complies with WTO laws.192 As soon as that is 
concluded, an interim report will be drafted and circulated to the parties to make comments.193 
The final panel report will then be issued and circulated to the DSB for adoption.194  
 
Similarly, if the panel report is appealed, the DSB will not adopt it but will rather refer it to the 
Appellate Body to conduct a legal review.195 The Appellate Body proceedings are initiated by 
a written notification to the DSB and a notice of appeal filed with the Appellate Body 
Secretariat.196 As mentioned above, the review scope of the Appellate Body is only ‘limited to 
issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel’.197 
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As with the panel proceedings, oral and written submissions will be made and these will be 
followed by a hearing.198 The Appellate Body will at the end of the review, issue its decision 
in a report which will either ‘uphold, modify or reverse the decision of the panel’.199 In terms 
of the DSU, Appellate Body reports are automatically adopted by the DSB unless it decides 
otherwise.200  
2.4.3 Implementation and countermeasures 
As soon as the panel or the Appellate Body report has been adopted by the DSB, the losing 
party is expected to comply with its recommendations.201 For example, in cases where the 
report has found that a measure was inconsistent with any of the covered agreements, the 
recommendations usually require that the respondent should ‘bring its measures in conformity 
with the WTO agreement’.202 The losing party will either comply with the recommendations 
immediately or request a reasonable time to implement the recommendations and rulings of 
the DSB.203 In terms of the DSU, the reasonable period may be determined in three ways: (a) 
proposed by the respondent and approved by the DSB;204 (b) decided by the parties within 45 
days after the adoption of a panel or the Appellate Body report;205 and (c) decided by an 
arbitrator within 90 days after the adoption of a panel or the Appellate Body report.206 
 
According to art 21.6, the DSB will also monitor the implementation of the adopted 
recommendations or rulings. If such implementation is not satisfactory, a compliance panel 
will be established to conduct an assessment of whether the implemented measure complies 
with the panel or Appellate Body ruling or whether it is consistent with the covered 
agreements.207 Article 22 of the DSU provides that if the assessment of the compliance panel 
finds that there is non-compliance, the complainant will be allowed to resort to the adoption of 
the following temporary measures, namely, a request for compensation or the suspension of its 
WTO obligations. The term ‘compensation’ in the WTO does not refer to a monetary payment 
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per se.208 Instead, the respondent is supposed to offer additional benefit to the other party in 
the form of a tariff reduction for as long as compliance is not achieved.209 The suspension of 
obligations comprises the right to impose trade sanctions against the respondent that failed to 
implement a ruling.210 However, art 22.2 of the DSU provides that prior authorisation from the 
DSB must first be sought before retaliation may be applied. Most importantly, the DSU 
requires that the level of retaliation authorised by the DSB must be ‘equivalent’ to the level of 
nullification or impairment.211 Article 2.1 of the DSU grants the DSB the authority to continue 
to maintain the surveillance of the implementation of rulings and recommendations of panels 
or the Appellate Body, for as long as the implementation is considered unsatisfactory. In 
addition, the WTO dispute settlement system provides other methods of settling disputes,212 
and these include good offices, conciliation, mediation,213 and arbitration.214  
 
2.5 The negotiations to improve the WTO dispute settlement system 
The need to reform the WTO dispute settlement system is widely acknowledged by the member 
states.215 McDougall argues that the US has been critical of the WTO dispute settlement system 
almost from the beginning.216 As such, discussions to review the DSU have always been on the 
agenda since the early 1990s.217 Kao argues that at the Ministerial Conference held in 
Marrakesh, Morocco in 1994, the ministers were mandated to conduct a review of the rules and 
procedures of the DSU within a period of four years following the adoption of the WTO 
Agreement  on 1 January 1995.218 The review was launched by the DSB in late 1997 and 
several proposals were submitted by the participants but they failed to finalise the negotiations 
before the set deadline.219 Hohmann argues that the review deadline was extended until 1999 
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but the negotiators were still unable to reach consensus on the results of the review.220 In 2001, 
at the 4th Ministerial Conference (MC4) held in Doha, Qatar, the ministers agreed to commence 
with the negotiations to ‘improve and clarify the WTO dispute settlement system’.221 
Furthermore, they agreed that the negotiations would be led in special sessions of the DSB.222 
Again, these efforts did not lead to an agreement. Lehne argues that most recently, at the 11th 
Ministerial Conference (MC11) held in Buenos Aires, Argentina in 2017, the US called for 
major WTO reform particularly the dispute settlement system and the functions of the members 
of the Appellate Body.223 Since then, several reform proposals to improve the system have 
been submitted but none of them have led to an agreement so far.224 It remains to be seen 
whether the members of the WTO will eventually reach consensus and improve the dispute 
settlement system. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the history of the WTO dispute settlement system. It explained that 
the system is built on the rules, procedures and practices that were developed under the GATT 
1947 dispute settlement system. In addition, the chapter further outlined some of the key 
institutional changes that were introduced to the WTO dispute settlement system at the end of 
the Uruguay Round, namely the fixed timetables, the specific procedures, and the establishment 
of powerful adjudicative bodies such as the Appellate Body. However, the WTO dispute 
settlement system also has several imperfections, one of which had prompted the US to block 
the appointment of new Appellate Body members since 2017. The following chapter will 
discuss the concerns raised by the US about the WTO dispute settlement system and the 
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Chapter 3: US dissatisfactions with the Appellate Body 
3. Introduction 
The previous chapter has outlined the history WTO dispute settlement system as well as the 
key institutions involved. This chapter, however, will discuss the concerns that multiple US 
administrations have raised about of the Appellate Body’s failure to adhere to the rules set by 
WTO members. These concerns have been divided into procedural and substantive issues. 
However, before they are discussed, the chapter will explain the reasons why the US is arguably 
retreating from the multilateral trading order it helped to build after the end of the Second 
World War (WWII) in the late 1940s in favour of unilateral actions. The last part of the chapter 
will offer closing remarks. 
3.1 Trump’s protectionism and its scepticism towards multilateral cooperation 
Dodwell argues that during his 2016 presidential campaign, President Donald Trump pledged 
to revamp US trade policy and prioritise advancing the economic interests of Americans in 
world trade.225 He also claimed that the US had been poorly served by disastrous, unfair and 
outdated Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the United States-Korea Free Trade 
Agreement (KORUS FTA).226 Williams argues that these RTAs which were negotiated by 
previous US administrations,227 were said to have damaged the US’s trade interests and 
reduced the economic opportunities for many American workers and businesses.228 Sperling 
& Webber argue that since he took office on 20 January 2017, President Trump has pursued a 
very aggressive protectionist trade agenda that threatens to unravel decades of a liberal 
international order which the US helped to build in the late 1940s.229 Within few days in the 
White House, President Trump fulfilled that key campaign promise by signing an executive 
order to formally withdraw the US from the TPP and began to renegotiate both the NAFTA 
and the KORUS FTAs.230  
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According to Vidigal, President Trump is also similarly dissatisfied with global governance 
institutions such as the WTO and particularly the dispute settlement system.231 For example, 
in 2018, he claimed that the WTO had been great for members such as China and terrible for 
the US,232 and the US was losing almost every case at the WTO.233 However, experts insist 
that the US has won approximately 90 per cent of the cases it filed against other countries in 
the WTO.234 At the same time, the US has also lost approximately 86 per cent of the cases 
which were filed against it by the other member states, particularly those relating to the use of 
trade remedies such as safeguards measures and antidumping duties.235 Fabry and Tate argue 
that the US’s win-loss ratio in the WTO is almost similar to that of the other member states.236 
Again in 2018, President Trump threatened to withdraw the US from the WTO ‘if it does not 
shape up’.237 Schneider-Petsinger argues that such withdrawal cannot happen without a formal 
approval from the US Congress.238 In addition, during a meeting in 2019, the Trump 
administration had threatened to block the adoption of the WTO’s biannual budget.239  
 
The US’s dissatisfaction with the WTO and the Appellate Body’s judicial function pre-dates 
the election of President Trump in November 2016 and it will not end with it.240 According to 
Creamer, for more than 20 years successive US administrations have expressed these concerns 
with no response from Geneva, while the other members of the WTO appeared to have tolerated 
or encouraged the Appellate Body’s actions.241 However, it is essential to note that the US’s 
blocking tactic began under the Obama administration in 2011 when it shocked the world by 
preventing the reappointment of Ms. Jennifer Hillman, supposedly for failing to defend US 
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interests in trade remedies disputes.242 This blocking was apparently repeated in 2016, by the 
Obama administration when it refused to give consent to the reappointment of Mr. Seung Wha 
Chang, supposedly for failing to function within the agreed mandates contained in the DSU.243 
Following the inauguration of President Trump in January 2017, the US’s concerns about the 
Appellate Body’s judicial activism were elevated to new heights.244 Vidigal argues that the 
Trump administration decided to veto all the selection processes initiated in the WTO to fill 
the vacant positions in the Appellate Body.245 At the time the Appellate Body had all seven 
members, but the terms of Mr. Ricardo Ramírez Hernández and Mr. Peter van den Bossche 
ended in 2017,246 while Mr. Hyun Chong Kim decided to resign from his position with 
immediate effect in August that year.247 Fabry and Tate argued that at the end of 2018, the 
Appellate Body was left with three members and these were Mr. Shree Baboo Chekitan 
Servansing, Mr. Ujal Singh Bhatia and Mr. Thomas R. Graham.248 However, by 10 December 
2019, the Appellate Body was left with one serving member, Ms. Hong Zhao whose term is 
also expiring on 20 November 2020.249   
3.2 An overview of the US’s concerns with the Appellate Body’s functions 
The following subsections will discuss the key concerns that have been raised by the US against 
the Appellate Body and they have been categorised into procedural and substantive issues. 
3.2.1 The procedural issues 
The procedural issues relate to the Appellate Body’s failure to respect the procedures governing 
the appellate process and they encompass the (a) the breach of the strict timeline for completing 
appeals; and (b) continued service by former Appellate Body members.250  
(a) Breach of the strict timeline for completing appeals 
Article 17.5 of the DSU provides that appeals must be completed within 60 days of their 
commencement but not later than 90 days in exceptional circumstances. If the deadline cannot 
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be met, the DSU requires the Appellate Body to consult the parties before the deadline is 
extended and to inform the DSB in writing of the reasons for the delay as well as the estimated 
date it intends to submit the report.251 The US has since 2011 criticised the Appellate Body for 
issuing its reports beyond the strict timeline under art 17.5 of the DSU.252 It  has also claimed 
that the Appellate Body no longer sought approval from the parties concerned before the 
deadline was extended,253 or provided the DSB with an estimate of the period within which it 
was likely to submit its report.254 The US claimed that the Appellate Body’s inability to comply 
with art 17.5 of the DSU was caused by its decision to issue unnecessary advisory opinions.255 
(b) Continued service by former Appellate Body members  
Article 17.2 of the DSU provides that persons to serve on the Appellate Body shall be appointed 
by the DSB for a four-year term, and each person may be reappointed only once. In accordance 
with art 17.9 of the DSU, the Appellate Body adopted Rule 15 of the Working Procedures for 
Appellate Review (also known as the transitioning rule) which authorises an Appellate Body 
member whose term had expired to continue to examine a case which they had been assigned 
during their term until its completion. The US has however, criticised the Appellate Body for 
permitting several individuals to continue to work on and decide appeals after the expiry of 
their tenures.256 It argued that outgoing Appellate Body members should not be allowed to 
work on pending appeals after their term expired,257 because it was violating the DSB’s 
exclusive authority to reappoint members to serve a second term.258 In addition, the US has 
argued that the application of Rule 15 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review was an 
amendment of the DSU and that it was not promulgated or approved by WTO members.259   
 
3.2.2 The substantive issues  
The substantive issues relate to the interpretation of WTO rules as contained in the covered 
agreements and they encompass the (a) review of facts and the municipal law of member states; 
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(b) issuing advisory opinions; (c) treatment of Appellate Body reports as binding precedent; 
and (d) issuing erroneous interpretations of the covered agreements.260 
(a) Review of facts and the municipal law of member states 
Article 17.6 of the DSU provides that the review scope of appeals is ‘limited to the legal aspects 
covered in the panel reports and the legal interpretation that was developed by the panel’. The 
US has criticised the Appellate Body of expanding its review scope by interfering with the 
panel’s fact finding authority.261 It argued that in terms of art to art 11 of the DSU, panels are 
the only adjudicative body in the WTO dispute settlement system that have the authority to 
review the factual issues. The US also added that the Appellate Body had created several legal 
standards which demonstrates when a review of factual findings might succeed.262 However, 
none of the provisions in the DSU have granted the Appellate Body with the authority to review 
the factual findings of panels.263 
 
Similarly, the US has criticised the Appellate Body for asserting that it has the authority to 
review the municipal law of member states.264 However, municipal law in the WTO is regarded 
as an issue of fact which expresses the will of the members.265 The US  has also argued that 
the Appellate Body failed to stipulate how its decision to review the municipal law of the 
member states was consistent with the review limit imposed by the DSU.266 As a result of the 
Appellate Body’s flawed approach, the US claimed that the division between factual and legal 
issues which were drawn at the end of the Uruguay Round had been eliminated.267 In addition, 
it departed from the division of responsibilities that are contained in the DSU where panels 
must assess or review the facts while the Appellate Body conducts a legal review of panel 
reports.268  
 
(b) Issuing advisory opinions 
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Article 3.2 of the DSU provides that the purpose of the dispute settlement system is to assist 
the members of the WTO to resolve their trade disputes. The US has criticised the Appellate 
Body of issuing advisory opinions on issues that were not necessary to resolve the dispute.269 
The term ‘advisory opinions’ refers to ‘a non-binding statement on a point of law given by [an 
adjudicator] before a case is tried or with respect to a hypothetical situation’.270 Kwa and Kwa 
also added that advisory opinions are a regular feature in the jurisprudence of common law 
countries.271 The US has argued that there are no provisions in the DSU that authorises the 
Appellate Body to issue advisory opinions.272 In fact, the issuing of advisory opinions was 
perceived as an attempt by the Appellate Body to make law rather than to resolve the dispute.273 
The Appellate Body was created to correct erroneous legal issues contained in panel reports 
and not to invent new rights and obligations of WTO members.274 In addition, the US has 
argued that advisory opinions contribute to the complexity of disputes which in turn cause 
delays in the appellate review proceedings.275 As a solution, the US proposed that when an 
issue that is not necessary to resolve the dispute is raised by the parties, the Appellate Body 
should exercise judicial economy and not rule on the issue.276  
 
(c) Treatment of Appellate Body reports as binding precedent 
Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement provides that the member states have the exclusive 
authority to adopt binding interpretations of the covered agreements in the Ministerial 
Conference. The US has criticised the Appellate Body for asserting that its previous reports are 
entitled to be treated as binding precedent that must be followed by panels.277 In common law 
systems, the term ‘binding precedent’ means ‘that this ruling is binding for a later decision on 
the same legal issue, i.e., that the legal issue in the later case has to be decided in the same way 
than in the earlier ruling’.278 The US has also argued that there was no formal system of binding 
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precedent in the WTO,279 and none of the covered agreements grants the Appellate Body 
reports a precedential value.280  
(d) Issuing erroneous interpretations of the covered agreements  
Article 3.2 of the DSU provides that the recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add 
to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements. The US has 
criticised the Appellate Body of exceeding its limited authority by adopting erroneous 
interpretations of the WTO Agreements,281 particularly in trade remedies disputes involving 
controversial issues such as subsidies, antidumping duties and countervailing measures, 
safeguards measures and standards.282 The US has argued that through this erroneous 
interpretation, the Appellate Body had limited the ability of WTO members to use the trade 
defense mechanisms to protect their interests against non-market economies such as China.283  
 
First, the US has raised concerns with the Appellate Body’s the interpretation of the term 
‘public body’ under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM).284 In 
United States — Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from 
China, the Appellate Body ruled that for an entity to constitute a ‘public body’ it must possess, 
exercise or be vested with governmental authority and be performing a governmental 
function.285 However, the US criticized that interpretation, arguing that it implied that anti-
subsidy measures can be imposed only if the complainant had provided sufficient evidence that 
the entity in question was either performing governmental functions or was vested with 
government authority.286 In the US view, that restrictive interpretation of the term ‘public body’ 
automatically excluded majority of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) that are owned and 
controlled by the Chinese government from the definition of subsidy in the ASCM.287 In 
addition, the US has argued  that the Appellate Body’s interpretation of ‘public body’ was not 
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based on the agreed legal texts of the WTO and was inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of 
the term.288 
 
Second, the US has raised concerns about the Appellate Body’s prohibition of the practice of 
zeroing when calculating the margins of dumping.289 In United States – Continued Existence 
and Application of Zeroing Methodology, the Appellate Body upheld the panel’s findings that 
the use of zeroing by the US Department of Commerce (USDOC) in anti-dumping measures 
was inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA) and the GATT 1947 provisions.290 
However, the US has criticised the Appellate Body’s ruling arguing that the ADA does not 
contain clear provisions that expressly prohibit the use of zeroing in the WTO.291 In addition, 
the US has argued that the Appellate Body’s reasoning for prohibiting the use of zeroing has 
not been consistent.292  
 
Third, the US has raised concerns with the Appellate Body’s interpretations of ‘unforeseen 
developments’ under the Agreement on Safeguards.293 In United States – Safeguard Measures 
on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia, the 
Appellate Body ruled that the US’s safeguard measures were inconsistent with the GATT 1994 
and the Agreement on Safeguards (SG Agreement).294 In addition, the Appellate Body had also 
invented a set of conditions that must be complied with before safeguard measures can be 
applied.295 The US has criticised the Appellate Body’s ruling on the grounds that it intruded on 
the regulatory space of the sovereign member states.296 It also argued that these set of 
conditions required for the imposition of safeguard measures that were invented by the 
Appellate Body were not based on the rules of the WTO.297  
 
Fourth, the US has raised concerns about the Appellate Body’s interpretation of the non-
discrimination obligation under the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT 
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Agreement).298 In United States — Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove 
Cigarettes, the Appellate Body found that the US ban on the sale of clove cigarettes while 
permitting the sale of menthol-flavoured cigarettes was discriminatory and inconsistent with 
the provisions of the TBT Agreement.299 The Appellate Body also added that the clove 
cigarettes (largely imported from Indonesia) and the menthol-flavoured cigarettes (mostly 
produced in the US) were like products and had to be treated equally.300 However, the US 
criticised the Appellate Body’s ruling, arguing that it had over-reached its judicial authority by 
assuming the role of the regulator.301 In addition, the US argued that the Appellate Body’s 
approach was not based on the provisions of the TBT Agreement.302  
3.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the systemic concerns provided by the US for blocking the 
appointment of new Appellate Body members since 2017. These concerns were divided into 
procedural and substantive issues. The procedural issues encompassed the (a) breach of the 
strict timeline for completing appeals and (b) continued service by former members of the 
Appellate Body. Meanwhile, the substantive issues encompassed the (a) review of facts and 
the municipal law of member states; (b) issuing of advisory opinions; (c) treatment of Appellate 
Body reports as binding precedent; and (d) issuing erroneous interpretations of the covered 
agreements. The next chapter will critically analyse these concerns to determine whether the 
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Chapter 4: A critical analysis of the US’s concerns with the Appellate Body 
4. Introduction 
The previous chapter has discussed the reasons behind the US’s decision to block the 
appointment of new Appellate Body members since 2017. This chapter will provide a critical 
analysis of these reasons to ascertain whether the Appellate Body has indeed strayed from its 
limited mandate. In addition, several Appellate Body reports will be used to support the 
analysis. The last part of the chapter will provide concluding remarks.  
4.1 An overview of the analysis  
The following subsections will critically analyse the US’s concerns with the Appellate Body’s 
judicial functioning.  
4.1.1 The procedural issues 
(a) Breach of the strict timeline for completing appeals 
This concern could be argued to have some credibility because, the Appellate Body has been 
reported to have concluded appeals outside the 90 days deadline since 2011.303 For example, 
in United States — Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft — Second Complaint, the 
notification to appeal was filed by the European Union (EU) on 1 April 2011 but the report 
was circulated to members on 12 March 2012.304 The US rightly asserted that the Appellate 
Body was also extending the 90 days deadline without consulting the parties about the delays 
or informing the DSB in writing of the reasons for the delay along with estimates of when it 
would issue the report.305 For example, in United States – Measures Affecting Imports of 
Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tyres from China, the Appellate Body had 
extended the 90 days deadline without having consulted the parties.306 However, in United 
States — Conditional Tax Incentives for Large Civil Aircraft, the Appellate Body informed the 
DSB that the estimated date for the circulation of the report would be communicated to the 
relevant parties in due course.307 
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Ehlermann argues, however, that the Appellate Body has found it difficult to adhere to art 17.5 
of the DSU over the past few years because of legitimate factors that were beyond its control.308 
These factors includes the increase in the number and size of appeals; the number of issues 
raised on appeal, including claims under art 11 of the DSU; the number of participants in 
appeals; the length of written and oral submissions.309 Condon also adds that most Appellate 
Body reports are written in English and then later translated into French and Spanish, the 
WTO’s two other official languages before they are circulated to the members.310 In order to 
meet the stipulated deadline, it means that the final draft of the Appellate Body report must be 
sent to the translators at least three weeks before the circulation date to allocate adequate time 
for revisions of the translators and printing processes.311 In addition, the reduction in the 
number of Appellate Body members over the past few years may have also hindered their 
ability to complete appeals timeously.  
(b) Continued service by former Appellate Body members 
This concern could be argued to have some credibility because certain Appellate Body 
members have continued to serve on appeals after their four-year terms had expired.312 For 
example, Mr. Hyun Chong Kim resigned with immediate effect from the Appellate Body on 1 
August 2017 to become South Korea’s Trade Minister,313 but he was one of  the three members 
that served on the appeal EU – Antidumping Measures on Imports of Certain Fatty Alcohols 
from Indonesia.314 Similarly, Mr. Ricardo Ramírez-Hernández's second term in the Appellate 
Body expired on 30 June 2017,315 but he continued to serve on the appeal EU – Antidumping 
Measures on Imports of Certain Fatty Alcohols from Indonesia.316 The US had rightly 
contended that Rule 15 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review was meant to apply 
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to relatively short periods of transition.317 However, since 2017 the rule had been invoked in 
several disputes, particularly for longer periods and sometimes it was applied a few days before 
a member of the Appellate Body’s term expired.318 For example, Mr. Ricardo Ramírez-
Hernández continued to decide appeals a couple of months after his term had expired.319 
However, with regards to the US’s argument that Rule 15 of the Working Procedures for 
Appellate Review was neither drafted nor approved by the member states was incorrect.320 In 
fact, Payosova, Hufbauer and Schott argued that the chairman of the DSB and the WTO 
Director-General were consulted by the Appellate Body at the time when the Working 
Procedures for Appellate Review were drafted and later adopted.321  
 
Bahri argues that Rule 15 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review was created to 
prevent any unnecessary delays or interruptions in the appellate proceedings between the 
period when a serving member’s term ends and the date when a new member is appointed.322 
For example, it normally takes up to three months to appoint a new member of the Appellate 
Body.323 Bahri also adds that without the application of Rule 15 of the Working Procedures for 
Appellate Review, the appellate process would have been time consuming. Thus, permitting 
an individual who had just ceased to be an Appellate Body member to continue working on a 
pending case rather than appointing someone entirely new who would require adequate time to 
familiarise themselves with the case seemed rational.324 In addition, transitioning rules like 
Rule 15 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review were applied by other international 
adjudicative bodies such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).325  
 
4.1.2 The substantive issues  
(a) Review of facts and the municipal law of member states 
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This concern could be argued to have some credibility because the Appellate Body has been 
reported to have been interfering with the panel’s assessment of the facts in several cases.326 
For example, in EC – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), the 
Appellate Body said that ‘for an Article 11 appeal to succeed, the complaining party needed to 
demonstrate that the panel had committed egregious error that calls into question the good faith 
of the panel’.327 Similarly, in European Communities and Certain member States — Measures 
Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft case, the Appellate Body ruled that ‘for a claim under 
Article 11 to succeed, we must be satisfied that the panel has exceeded its authority as the trier 
of facts’.328  
 
There is also notable evidence suggesting that the Appellate Body has also been reviewing 
panel findings on the meaning of municipal law of member states.329 For example, in United 
States — Countervailing and Anti-dumping Measures on Certain Products from China, the 
Appellate Body reviewed the US’s countervailing duty law as a legal issue.330 Similarly, in the 
India — Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products case, the 
Appellate Body examined India’s municipal law as a legal issue.331 However, it is well known 
in the WTO that the meaning of municipal law is an issue of fact and not subject for review.332 
 
In practice, it is often difficult to distinguish issues of law from issues of fact especially since 
the DSU or the Appellate Body’s Working Procedures for Appellate Review does not provide 
clear definitions.333 As a result, the Appellate Body has been approaching this issue on a case-
by-case basis.334 In addition, Bercero argues that the significant increase of factual complexity 
of disputes may have also caused the Appellate Body to intrude on the authority of panels.335 
 
326 WTO Minutes of the DSB meeting of 27 August 2018 (WT/DSB/M/417), paras. 4.1 – 4.17. 
327 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), para. 133. 
328 WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities and Certain member States — Measures Affecting Trade 
in Large Civil Aircraft para. 881. 
329 Lighthizer op cit note 23 at 40. 
330 WTO Appellate Body Report, United States — Countervailing and Anti-dumping Measures on Certain 
Products from China. 
331 WTO Appellate Body Report, India — Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical 
Products, para. 68 
332 US Statements by the United States at the meeting of the WTO dispute settlement body 
Geneva, August 27, 2018, at 15.  
333 UNCTAD Dispute settlement 2003 United Nations at 10, available at 
https://unctad.org/en/Docs/edmmisc232add17_en.pdf,  accessed on 20 July 2020. 
334 Tania Voon & Alan Yanovich ‘The facts aside: The limitation of WTO appeals to issues of law’ (2006) 40(2) 
Journal of World Trade at 244. 
335 Ignacio Garcia Bercero ‘What do we need a World Trade Organization for? The crisis of the rule-based trading 
system and WTO reform’ (2020) Bertelsmann Stiftung at 33. 
40 
 
(b) Issuing advisory opinions 
This concern could not be argued to have some credibility because for starters, the Appellate 
Body has never explicitly claimed that it has the authority to issue advisory opinions.336 
However, in terms of the DSU provisions, the Appellate Body is required to analyse each of 
the legal issues that the parties have raised in the appeal.337 This provision also indicates that 
the Appellate Body does not have the choice to exercise judicial economy and refuse to rule on 
any issue raised by a party even if it is considered unnecessary to resolve the dispute.338 
However, Raina argues that it is essential to note that the DSU does not contain clear provisions 
prohibiting the Appellate Body from analysing issues that were not raised by the parties.339  
(c) Treatment of Appellate Body reports as binding precedent 
This concern could be argued to have some credibility because several cases, particularly on 
the issue of zeroing, have been considered as precedent with persuasive effect by panels.340 For 
example, in United States — Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews, the Appellate 
Body had referred to its earlier report in United States — Final Dumping Determination on 
Softwood Lumber from Canada to justify its ruling that the use of zeroing was inconsistent with 
the Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA).341 Similarly in United States — Laws, Regulations and 
Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins (Zeroing), the panel held that the issues that 
were raised by the US had already been addressed by the Appellate Body in United States — 
Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada and departing from it would 
have been deemed inappropriate.342 Similarly, in United States — Continued Existence and 
Application of Zeroing Methodology, the Appellate Body had suggested that panels should 
follow the interpretations adopted in its previous reports on the same legal issues unless there 
were factors to justify its deviation.343 However, in as much as there is no formal system of 
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binding precedent in the WTO, previous Appellate Body reports often do assist in the 
clarification of the covered agreements. 
(d) Issuing erroneous interpretations of the covered agreements  
It is arguably difficult to ascertain the validity of this concern because each member state brings 
its own understanding of what the provisions of the covered agreements mean. However, 
Tirkey asserts that the Appellate Body’s alleged judicial overreach in its reports could have 
been caused by factors which are not its fault.344 First, the WTO is responsible for overseeing 
several trade agreements that contains highly technical provisions such as anti-dumping, 
subsidies, countervailing measures and safeguards.345 In addition, some of the covered 
agreements contain vague provisions, with unclear definitions and contradictory elements.346 
For example, the test for determining if a product has been dumped under art 2 of the ADA is 
excessively lengthy.347 As a result, the Appellate Body finds itself in a difficult position where 
it must interpret and clarify old provisions in modern disputes while at the same time try to 
ensure that the rights and obligations of member states are neither added nor diminished.348 
Second, art 16 and art 17 of the DSU are the only two provisions that regulate the appellate 
proceedings in the WTO dispute settlement system.349 However, these provisions do not 
contain clear rules and standards of review, thus the Appellate Body inadvertently trespasses 
into the law-making function that is exclusively reserved for the member states.350 Third, the 
DSU contains multiple objectives that offer competing visions of the WTO dispute settlement 
system and the mandates of the adjudicative bodies especially the Appellate Body.351 For 
example, art 3 of the DSU states that the WTO dispute settlement system seeks to provide 
‘security and predictability to the multilateral trading system’. At the same time, the Appellate 
Body is expected by the DSU to fulfil its functions without ‘adding to or diminishing the rights 
and obligations’ of WTO members.352   
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This chapter has critically analysed the concerns raised by the US for blocking the appointment 
of new Appellate Body members. It also demonstrated that most of these concerns were not 
unfounded especially those relating to the procedural aspects. For example, some appeals were 
completed beyond 90 days strict deadline; former Appellate Body members have decided 
pending appeals; appeals have re-examined the facts of panels and the municipal law of 
member states; and Appellate Body reports have been used as binding precedent. However, the 
US’s concerns over the issuing of advisory opinions and the erroneous interpretations of the 
covered agreements were difficult to analyse because every member state bring their own 
understanding of what the provisions mean. The following chapter will summarise the previous 
chapters and provide recommendations to overcome the crisis in the Appellate Body while a 

















Chapter 5: Conclusion and recommendations 
5. Introduction 
The focus of this research has been on the WTO dispute settlement system and the crisis in the 
Appellate Body. It sought to examine the merits of the long-standing concerns that the US had 
raised about the Appellate Body’s judicial function. This chapter will summarise the findings 
of the previous chapters and propose recommendations on how the Appellate Body crisis may 
be bypassed and ensure that appeals are resolved while a permanent solution is sought by the 
members states 
5.1 Summary of the chapters 
Chapter 1 introduced the research and provided a background to the appointment deadlock in 
the Appellate Body as well as the existing gaps in literature. It argued that while numerous 
scholars have criticised the US’s decision to block new appointments to the Appellate Body 
they have, however, rarely analysed the validity of the concerns raised. The chapter also 
highlighted the implications that the Appellate Body crisis might have on the WTO dispute 
settlement system. Chapter 2 discussed the historical trajectory of the WTO dispute settlement 
system. It argued that the system had been in place for more than two decades and builds on 
the system that existed under the GATT 1947. The chapter also discussed some of the key 
institutional changes that were created at the end of the Uruguay Round negotiations in 1994, 
particularly the Appellate Body. In addition, the chapter also looked at the discussions to 
review the WTO dispute settlement system which had been on the agenda since the early 1990s 
but were never concluded. Chapter 3 discussed the US’s concerns with the Appellate Body’s 
judicial conduct and demonstrated how as well as why they were elevated to new heights 
following the election of President Trump in November 2016. In addition, these concerns were 
divided into procedural and substantive issues. Chapter 4 analysed these concerns and found 
that majority of them were not unfounded. In fact, they are widely shared by the other members 
of the WTO. For example, appeals are often completed beyond 90 days strict deadline; former 
Appellate Body members have decided pending appeals; appeals have re-examined the facts 
of panels and the municipal law of member states; and previous Appellate Body reports have 
been used as binding precedent. However, the concerns relating to the issuing of advisory 
opinions and the erroneous interpretations of the covered agreements were difficult to analyse 





This section considers the various recommendations that have been suggested by academic 
writers and WTO members to bypass the crisis in the Appellate Body. They range between 
simpler options such as using alternative dispute settlement mechanisms already provided for 
in the DSU to vigorous options such as amending the DSU to remove the member’s rights to 
file appeals.  
5.2.1 Removing the appellate review stage from the WTO system 
Chance has recommended that the Appellate Body should amend its Working Procedures for 
Appellate Review under art 17.9 of the DSU and remove the appellate review process from the 
WTO dispute settlement system.353 This means that if an appeal is filed and the composition 
of the Appellate Body is below the minimum number of members required to hear and decide 
an appeal, then that appeal would be considered as automatically ‘completed’ and circulated to 
the DSB for adoption.354 Fabry and Tate argues that the rules for amending the Appellate 
Body’s Working Procedures for Appellate Review are quite flexible because they do not 
require consensus from the DSB.355 There are concerns, however, that this option will deprive 
the member states the right to appeal panel reports as provided for under art 17 of the DSU.356 
At the same time, it is difficult to imagine how the Appellate Body would support this option, 
especially since it is currently being criticised by the US of engaging in judicial activism.357 In 
addition, Rule 3.1 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review requires the decisions of 
the Appellate Body to be taken as a whole, however, its composition is currently left with one 
serving member Ms. Hong Zhao, whose term ends on 30 November 2020.358 
5.2.2 Disputing parties may sign a ‘no appeal agreement’ 
Pauwelyn has suggested that the member states could agree in advance to waive their right to 
appeal panel reports by signing a ‘no appeal agreement’ in respect of each dispute filed.359 For 
example, Indonesia and Vietnam signed a similar agreement in 2019, that they would not 
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appeal the panel report issued in the Indonesia — Safeguard on Certain Iron or Steel Products 
case, if the Appellate Body had less than the minimum number of members required to hear 
and decide the appeal.360 Scholars such as Deepak argue that this option will assist in reducing 
the financial costs of litigation and will ensure that trade disputes are settled promptly.361 
However, Chance argues that majority of the WTO members would be reluctant to sign the ‘no 
appeal agreement’ because it would permit the automatic adoption of erroneous panel 
reports.362  
5.2.3 Appointing new members of the Appellate Body through voting 
Deepak has suggested that the member states should directly appoint new members of the 
Appellate Body using the majority vote procedure under art IX.1 of the Marrakesh 
Agreement.363 However, Hillman argues that this option would undoubtedly be the most 
controversial even though a voting procedure is legitimate in the rules of the WTO.364 She also 
claimed that in the past 25 years of the WTO’s existence, the member states have always 
adhered to the consensus-based decision-making approach that was followed under GATT 
1947.365 However, Pauwelyn claims that this option may not be adopted, because there is little 
political will among the other members of the WTO to side-line the US or to set a bad precedent 
that may backfire against them in the future.366 
5.2.4 Agreeing to adopt a plurilateral dispute settlement agreement without the US 
Deepak has suggested that the member states could establish an arrangement that is similar to 
either the Appellate Body procedure or the whole dispute settlement mechanism in a separate 
agreement outside of the WTO framework.367 However, negotiating a new plurilateral 
agreement would be challenging particularly under the existing conditions in the WTO.368 
According to Deepak, the rules of the WTO will require the plurilateral agreement to be 
approved by all the members through a consensus-based decision-making approach.369 In 
addition, any dispute settlement mechanism that excludes the US may be considered defective, 
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particularly when considering the country’s economic position in global trade or perhaps the 
number of trade disputes that are usually filed against it at the WTO.370 However, if the US 
were to choose to opt out of the plurilateral agreement, Deepak argues that the other member 
states may not find it worthwhile to proceed and sign it.371  
5.2.5 Resorting to alternative dispute settlement mechanisms available in the DSU 
Article 5 of the DSU provides for other methods of resolving disputes and they include good 
offices, conciliation, and mediation. The benefits of using this option is that it is purely 
voluntary, can be initiated or to terminated by any party at any time and it guarantees 
confidentiality.372 In addition, the DSU provides that ‘The Director-General may, acting in an 
ex officio capacity, offer good offices, conciliation or mediation with the view to assisting 
Members to settle a dispute’.373 However, third parties do not have the right to participate in 
the process unless the parties concerned grants them the permission to do so.374  
5.2.6 Resolving appeals by using the arbitration process in the DSU 
Some writers have suggested that the member states could use the arbitration proceedings under 
art 25 of the DSU as a temporary alternative appeal mechanism.375 Hillman argues that 
arbitration is the only option available to WTO members that does not require the rules in the 
DSU to be amended or a consensus decision by the DSB.376 This option has gained the most 
traction among the member states as an alternative and temporary plan to ensure that the 
appellate process continues to function despite the collapse of the Appellate Body in December 
2019.377 For example, the EU and 15 other members of the WTO agreed to sign a Multi-Party 
Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) to replace the Appellate Body’s functions at 
least until it has enough members to hear new appeals.378 These countries formally notified the 
WTO on 30 April 2020 that a pool of 10 arbitrators would be formed that could be selected to 
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hear future appeals and that they planned to finalise the composition of this pool within three 
months.379 However, there are concerns that this option will undermine the efforts to find 
sustainable solutions to the US’s long-standing concerns with the Appellate Body’s judicial 
conduct.380 Hillman also argues that the MPIA is not a suitable option in the long term because 
it will only be used to resolve appeals between the member states that have signed it.381 
However, the US has not signed the MPIA and Erasmus argues that it is unlikely to do so in 
the future.382 This will mean that appealed panel reports involving one of the world’s largest 
trading economy and the WTO’s most frequent user of the dispute settlement system will not 
be resolved through the MPIA.383  
5.3 Conclusion  
The crisis in the Appellate Body poses a serious threat to the WTO’s dispute settlement 
function. In addition, it is essential to acknowledge that the concerns raised by the US about 
the Appellate Body’s actions did not start with the election of President Donald Trump in 2016 
and will probably not end with it. In fact, the US has publicly reiterated on numerous occasions 
that it will continue to block further appointments to the Appellate Body unless its concerns 
have been adequately addressed by the other members. However, it remains uncertain amongst 
the other members as to what can be done to satisfy the US, especially since it rejected all the 
calls to provide possible solutions. Nonetheless, an effective and sustainable solution for the 
Appellate Body crisis will require all the member states to bring the US to the negotiation table 
and engage in constructive discussions, especially since many of these concerns raised were 
arguably valid. However, the postponement of the 12th Ministerial Conference (MC12) 
originally scheduled for June 2020 due to the coronavirus pandemic has certainly diminished 
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